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Abstract
This article contributes to a more nuanced and contextual approach to women’s
decision-making concerning their stored IVF (in vitro fertilisation) embryos
through attempting to craft a space for the expression of the complex, and con-
tradictory, emotions attached to these decisions, unhooked from any notion of
abstract moral status inhering in the embryo itself. Women struggle to express the
confounding nature of the relationship to the stored IVF embryo as something of-
the-body but not within the body, neither self nor other, person nor thing. In order
to try to address this sense of the ineffable, I draw in this article upon a series of
images by German-born American artist, Kiki Smith. The article explores three
major themes, each alongside one of Smith’s artworks connecting to an experience
of discomfort or confounding unease.
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I feel like they are potential, there is the potential there for life. There is
the potential there for a child, but at the moment they are just cells; cells
hovering, waiting for their chance to come out of the freezer. (Rose)
[D]o you say goodbye to them, is that an occasion, is that something
to be marked? Should there be some ceremony? Every other culture
probably would. I mean, no other culture would. (Ruby)
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This article draws upon a series of artworks by German-born
American artist Kiki Smith in order to explore the ways in which
women speak of, and understand, their stored in vitro fertilisation
(IVF) embryos.1 I suggest that using these artworks as a framing
device can assist to better understand the complexity of women’s
decision-making around embryo disposition, including, but not lim-
ited to, the desire of some women to be physically and emotionally
involved in the embryo destruction and discard process. Such invol-
vement can run the gamut from a wish to be present in a clinic as
embryos are unfrozen, to taking them away to engage in a private
form of ceremony or ritual such as burial, to medical assistance in
performing a return of embryos to the body in a manner not
intended to cause pregnancy (sometimes referred to as ‘compassio-
nate transfer’) (Ellison and Karpin, 2011; Karpin et al., 2013).
These wishes and practices are still largely considered to be ‘fringe’
in current clinical and ethical thinking, and are rarely and reluc-
tantly accommodated, if at all, by most fertility clinics (Gurmankin
et al., 2004; Karpin et al., 2013). Indeed, some of these practices are
expressly prevented by law in jurisdictions with prescriptive
embryo storage and discard rules (e.g. in Victoria, Australia; see
Karpin et al., 2013).
Taking up Sarah Franklin’s early insight that the IVF embryo has
a ‘liminality in its contested location between science and nature’
(Franklin, 1995: 337), I explore in detail how women expressed that
contested location both as an out-of-bodily process and as an emo-
tional relation. David Ellison and Isabel Karpin have noted that
disposing of stored embryos triggers another layer of liminality;
one between life and death, as the not-quite-alive-embryo is dis-
carded to a not-quite-death (Ellison and Karpin, 2011).
I have eight in storage . . . it’s awful. It doesn’t bother [my husband] at
all. I just talked about it again, I said, ‘What do you think’s happening
with our embryos?’ He goes, ‘I don’t know, won’t they just
die?’ . . .He’s got no idea. It’s huge. He’s going, ‘What are you wor-
ried about?’ It’s the biggest thing in the world, eight potential chil-
dren, what do you do with them? Do you just knock them off? It’s
awful. It’s huge. (Ruby)
The interview transcripts of women2 that I explore here are replete
with contradictions, mixed metaphors and incomplete or halting
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sentences in which the embryo is said to be like this but not this, and
also not quite that. These tangled quotes reflect both the struggle to
make meaning and the struggle to speak that meaning in the face of
cultural, legal and clinical frames that, to date, have not reflected
women’s lived experiences of IVF.
I tell you what; having embryos, like, it’s a blessing, but . . . I cannot
bear knowing there’s an embryo in a lab that’s frozen; it’s not just an
egg, and it’s not just a sperm, it’s already a little person. I mean, it’s not
a person, but it’s already our genetic coding combination, so – (Nikki)
At the time of interview Nikki had two young children through
IVF processes that had taken her several years, with three embryos
still in storage. Nikki wanted to use the remaining embryos, but was
equally pragmatic about her husband’s reluctance to have any more
children and her ability to manage should they all succeed; such that
she also acknowledged the unlikelihood of future use. The quote
above from Nikki features many of the elements I address in this
article: discomfort with the disembodied and disconnected exis-
tence of the embryo and rippling contradictions about both what
the embryo is and what it means. Nikki contradicts her initial char-
acterisation of the embryo as ‘already a little person’ instantly: ‘I
mean, it’s not a person’, but then reinscribes a sense of its unique-
ness and already formed but unrealised potential through the frame
of genetic ‘coding’. But then again she breaks off and doesn’t
complete the sentence, as she is unable to offer a concluded or
definitive characterisation of what the embryo is or means. Later
Nikki says that her clinic ‘thawed the one that looks the best to
sustain life’ – that is, after speaking of embryos as little people and
children she instead characterises the embryo as an environment in
which life arises.
Having written previously in legal fora about how law and policy in
assisted reproduction should be reformed in numerous respects to be
more responsive to IVF participants’ needs and concerns, I was left
with the lingering sense that I had still failed to grapple with the
intense complexity of participants’ experiences of disembodied rela-
tionality (Millbank, 2017). Here I return to these narratives to engage
more deeply with the confounding nature of the relationship to the
stored IVF embryo, as something of-the-body but not within the body,
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neither self nor other, person nor thing. I suggest that ex-utero embryos
trigger an experience of relationality that is inevitably ineffable.
The article explores three major themes, each alongside one of
Kiki Smith’s artworks. These themes all connect to an experience
of discomfort or confounding unease, and reflect the struggle to
express individual embodied meaning about one’s IVF embryos in
socially intelligible ways. The first section explores women’s
sense of the out-of-placeness of their ex-utero embryos; the sec-
ond addresses women’s experience of chance in the selection and
use of embryos; and in the third section, I explore feelings of
waste and loss about the prospect of embryo destruction. First, I
explain in more detail the choice of the visual arts, and Kiki
Smith’s works in particular, as a framing device for exploring
this experience of the ineffable.
Framing the Confounding and Unsayable
Siri Hustvedt has characterised Kiki Smith’s work as an experience
of the:
borderline where the articulated lines between inside and outside,
whole and part, waking and sleeping, human and animal, ‘I’ and ‘not
I’ are often in abeyance. It is a territory of metamorpho-
ses . . . (Hustvedt, 2006: 73)
Indeed, Smith herself said of her work that an ‘underlying concern in
her art’ was ‘form being separated from matter’ (Smith interviewed
by McCormick, 1991: 3)
The visual arts provide a space of interpretation that allows for
subjective meanings to collide and intermingle in a non-linear non-
literal way (Lyotard, 2004). Scholars in law, culture and visual studies
suggest that engagement in the visual arts shifts us away from the
didactic, logical and propositional claims of law to allow space for
reflection, latency, contradiction and, above all, emotion (Douzinas
and Nead, 1999: 3–4; Sherwin, 2013: xxxiii). In order to try to engage
with a sense of the ineffable in the space-in-between that exists with a
woman and her ex-utero embryos, I draw upon Kiki Smith’s work as a
particularly fertile oeuvre of liminality. A series of images by Kiki
Smith are utilised as a framing device, within which I place a discus-
sion of women’s relationality to their ex-utero embryos, their bodies
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and the IVF process, drawn from interview transcripts, in order to try
to draw out the partly said, unsaid and unsayable.
Kiki Smith’s brilliant and diverse body of work has long con-
cerned itself with the abject and the bodily.3 Many of Smith’s early
works represented internal organs and systems in uncanny detail
(Edouard, 2004; Lima, 2014: 281) but in unlikely or discordant
media, such as wax, glass, plaster, paper and ceramics. From the
1980s through to the early 2000s Smith addressed reproductive and
maternal issues in numerous sculptures, prints and installations.
(Smith has the rare honour of being reviewed in The Lancet:
Edouard, 2004.) Maria Lima has noted that, ‘Smith’s interest in
anatomy has less to do with the body’s appearance than with its
processes, failures and traumas’ (Lima, 2014: 281).
These evocative and provocative artworks help us to explore, and
hopefully better understand, women’s complex and shifting sense of
connection or relatedness to their stored IVF embryos as both inside
and outside their bodies, connected and distant, posing potentiality
and loss. Engaging with these highly individualised, even idiosyn-
cratic, and contradictory sensibilities is important to framing a more
responsive system of legal regulation, ethical guidance and clinical
practice concerning decision-making about IVF embryos.
One of Smith’s earlier screen prints, Black Flag (Figure 1),
depicts, in exquisite detail, a disembodied human oocyte with its
Figure 1. Black Flag, c. 1989, screen print.
Source: #Kiki Smith, image courtesy of the Victoria & Albert Museum.
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protective cells in place. The title of the piece juxtaposes the public
claim of nation-state, the flag, with the image of something minutely
personal, invisible to the naked eye, indisputably feminine: a human
egg. A black flag is the opposite of the white symbol of surrender,
evoking defiance and anarchy4 as well as death. Death and life, the
nation and the intimate, are counterposed. The Victoria & Albert
Museum, which holds one of the prints of this work, describes this
piece as appealing through its ‘combination of menace and beauty’
adding that:
Flag-waving can be about victory, fraternity and solidarity but also
about protest and warning. Flags signal messages to those who have
learned a special language, but can also communicate to people with
no specialist knowledge beyond a fairly general cultural awareness.
(Victoria & Albert Museum, n.d.)
The image also, if one tilts one’s head to the left to view it at an
angle, looks somewhat comically like a tiny frowny-faced icon wear-
ing a bumpy hat or curly hair.5
Black Flag laid the groundwork for Smith’s oeuvre of reproduc-
tive works, involving a profound laying bare of (mostly female)
bodies, crossing of borders and confrontations of disgust and respect.
Helaine Posner has written that:
Smith regards the female body as an entity that will not be contained,
from which ‘Things naturally fall out.’ . . .Most often these fragile
sculptures refer to the vulnerability of the female body in regard to
its reproductive possibilities . . . . For Smith, the female body, partic-
ularly in its biological role as related to the cycles and processes of
reproduction, is in a perpetual state of instability or flux, always
changing and constantly being made anew. (Posner, 2005: 17–18)
Similarly, Siri Hustvedt notes that Smith ‘plays relentlessly with
the problem of flux’, fluidity and thresholds, and adds that
‘umbilical connections, both overt and subliminal, recur repeat-
edly’ in her work (Hustvedt, 2006: 75). It is Smith’s preoccupa-
tion with connectedness, within and across bodies, which, I
suggest, offers a useful platform from which to explore the
themes of women’s complex and confounding sense of relation
with their IVF embryos.
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Displacement, Exposure and the Not Visible
A bronze sculpture (Figure 2) by Smith depicts a womb, but not in a
typical medical illustration of a cross-section and/or with foetus in
utero. Rather, it lies open, enlarged as if with pregnancy, but empty.
The uterus is handled, literally and figuratively, and opens through an
external metal hinge. Helaine Posner has written that this sculpture,
while associated with conflict over abortion rights in the United
States, also ‘suggests a votive offering presented with the hope of
healing the afflicted body part’ (Posner, 2005: 15), while Siri Hust-
vedt writes that it evokes an archaeological relic, as it ‘resembles a
vessel or bowl from a dig, and simultaneously unearths a host of
container associations, including small coffins or tombs’ (Hustvedt,
2006: 72). Interestingly, these writers see the object as evocative of
both life and death, creation and loss. In my view, this sculpture
speaks to the disjuncture that women express between the ‘intimate’
and ‘personal’ experience of reproduction, within a highly mechan-
ised and depersonalised IVF system. For example, in our study
Jacqui described IVF as ‘quite an out of body experience’. Jacqui
and many women referred to the IVF process as ‘invasive’ and
‘traumatic’ (Mariana), and characterised it as an intrusion, both
physically and emotionally. Irina Aristarkhova has argued that ‘it
is not useful to counterpose mother and machine when in fact the
history of the life sciences has contributed to a “mechanization” of
the material body, most especially in embryology’ (Aristarkhova,
Figure 2. Womb, 1986, bronze.
Source: # Kiki Smith, image courtesy the Pace Gallery.
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2005: 45). This sculpture speaks to women’s embodied relation to
the ‘unnatural’ in IVF processes; the machine is part of them and
part of them is in a machine.
This bronze womb is hard, cold and empty – evoking the wrong-
ness and the out-of-placeness that women struggled to express about
the location of their ex-utero embryos in cold storage. Embryos were
created from, and of, the woman, and intended for return to her: at the
time of generation these were steps in the process of a pregnancy-to-
be, but return was interrupted and prolonged in unanticipated ways, for
months, years, or possibly for ever; and it is this sense of both dis-
embodiment and disjuncture that was experienced as deeply jarring.
knowing that they’re just sitting there, sitting there, sitting there and I
can’t use them, it creates a whole way of thinking around them that is
different, I think, than it would otherwise be. (Danielle)
Women referred to their stored embryos as ‘hovering’ (Ruby, Rose),
‘floating’ (Clarice), ‘suspended’ (Laurie) and ‘remote’ (Sam). In con-
trast, pursuing pregnancy attempts through embryo transfer was
described as ‘putting them back’ (Apple, Clarice, Scoot, Danielle).
Laurie, whose six embryos had been destroyed a few years earlier,
after she had been prevented from donating them for reproductive
use, said of this out-of-body-ness:
It’s really tough to try and make sense of – because I’ve not been in
the situation of being pregnant and thinking about whether I should
have an abortion or anything like that. But I imagine you can expe-
rience the sense of being pregnant, so there’s some kind of connection
there about what you’re doing. But the embryos, they’re kind of there
but they’re – they’re part of you, but they’re outside of you in a clinic
with scientists, god forbid . . .
I think like – their status external to me was a temporary status. The
whole thing about IVF is that you go in for treatment. Embryos are
implanted and some are put aside for the next round. The normal
assumption is that they’re there waiting to be re-implanted. I don’t
think there’s any separation that’s there, except . . . a clinical inter-
vention that takes place. But here we’ve got a situation where their
relationship to me is profoundly external over a period of time—[and]
what you’ve now got is this other [agency] that’s saying, well this is
how you’re going to use your body parts.
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Laurie, like a number of other women, slipped between speaking
of the embryos as both distinct entities and as part of her own body,
reflecting an experience of connectedness that transcended the phys-
ical separation and also, at times, verged on a sense of embodiment or
even of ownership.
Smith’s sculpture of the bronze womb also speaks to the ways in
which the technological process of IVF opens, makes visible and
extends the experience of conception, and pregnancy loss. Feminist
scholars have written about the ways in which the visualisation of the
foetus during pregnancyhas opened a space of identification and attach-
ment (Petchesky, 1987) and also, by extension, the prospect of an
intensified sense of loss in instances of early pregnancy loss (Cosgrove,
2004: 110). This process of visualisation extends also to embryos,
which are now often shown to patients immediately prior to the transfer
process, and are alsomaterialised through their characterisation by staff
in terms of their cell size or development, technical grade or more
evocatively as ‘healthy’ or ‘beautiful’ looking embryos.
Many fertilised embryos are graded as not suitable for transfer or
freezing in routine clinical processes (Ehrich et al., 2010). Some are
tested and found to be affected by genetic conditions. Thus it is
common for embryos to be discarded without any plan for embodi-
ment. In our cohort of interviewees, only two, Jess and Juliet, ques-
tioned this external determination of viability and expressed
discomfort about its accuracy. All of the other interviewees accepted
that stored and transferred embryos were ‘potential babies’ while the
other non-stored embryos did not have this potentiality. Relatedly,
once embryos were characterised as useable and stored or trans-
ferred, women were much more likely to see the embryo as part of
a pregnancy, even if no pregnancy subsequently arose.
Laurie said:
most women who don’t go through fertility programs, they miscarry
and they don’t even know. There’s this whole kind of technological
interface that opens up all these spaces. I can count on both hands
how many times I’ve miscarried, but sometimes it’s a very, very
early stage.
Monique struggled to analogise her failed pregnancy attempts to
other forms of reproductive loss, without actually calling it a
miscarriage:
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By the time any woman – as far as I understand it – has got a blas-
tocyst in her womb – whether it’s a natural pregnancy or not – like
that’s already a pregnancy. It’s already a live thing . . . like I gave
myself a day to get over it each time it didn’t work and some people
didn’t understand that. Like it was like, oh well there must have been
something wrong with it – move on – you can try again. So I think –
and that was an actual part of me by that time . . . I don’t think a lot of
people would understand that . . .
The opening of this space was possible not only through the
knowledge of the existence of the fertilised in-utero embryo, but
through its visualisation. A number of Australian clinics intro-
duced imaging during the transfer process while the study was
being undertaken, and several women commented upon the expe-
rience of seeing their embryo magnified on a screen during their
treatment (Danielle, Olivia).
[IVF] is so invasive and it’s really quite traumatic. To go through
this process, and you get these things at the end of it, right, and when
they transfer them, they show you them on the screen. There’s just
six cells or eight cells or whatever they are, and we actually saw
Libby on the screen like that. Look at her now. There’s nine more of
them frozen. Now, every single one of them has an opportunity to be
a little person. (Mariana)
[M]y feelings changed, I think, after the first transfer because you can
actually see the embryo go in. They do an ultrasound while they’re
inserting them and you can actually see on the screen the embryos go
in which is quite an amazing process. I’ve also got a photo – a three-
day cell photo – of Bianca. So that also kind of changed my thinking
around what they meant. (Jasmine)
In contrast, Jacqui described seeing the image as connecting her to
the process, and also to the woman who was assisting it, but refused
to take a photo because so many cycles had previously failed, impli-
citly rejecting a relation to the embryo through the image.
Each time that we had an implantation they put a picture up on the
screen from the – a little photo from the – in the other room . . . . [The
embryologist] would always say ‘This is a lovely embryo, it’s divided
this many times, see that.’ . . . So she would personalise it. Then she’d
say, ‘It’s a lovely embryo, good luck.’ That was really, really nice. It
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was very nice to feel a connection with the scientist who cared about
me, not just the doctor. But I suppose people don’t – I know some
people take photos of them, but after so many of them failed I thought:
I’m not taking photos.
At the same time, several women asserted the meaning and sig-
nificance of the embryo to them even though they were so small as to
not be visible to the naked eye:
But you know, I don’t like the idea that they’ll just dump them in the
rubbish bin either. I’d rather go in and say, give me my embryos and
I’ll take them home and have a little ceremony or plant a tree and put
them under that. I know they must be minute, you probably can’t even
see them with the naked eye but they’re mine and they have meaning
to me. (Scoot)
At the point of destruction, Laurie, Phoebe and Jasmine all
expressed a strong desire for ‘something tangible’. Phoebe was
given possession of the straws containing her embryos after they
were no longer viable, while Jasmine was denied access to the
straws as the clinic required the permission of her former partner
which he denied.6 Jasmine asked for, and was given, a photo of the
vials instead. In taking possession of straws and persisting in
requests for photos or other forms of material expression of their
embryos, women re-negotiated the terms of the mechanical IVF
interface, creating artefacts for their own private processes of
memorialisation.
Interchangeability and the Fates
It was quite rare for women to openly acknowledge the statistical
unlikelihood of any one embryo eventuating in life, although many
recounted at the outset of the interview (in response to the opening
question ‘Where are you in your IVF journey?’) the number of sti-
mulated and transfer cycles they had undertaken, numbers of eggs
retrieved and fertilised, transferred, stored and not stored, thawed and
failed to thaw, along the way. The language of death and survival
seeped into these accounts, regardless of the views of the participants
of embryos as entities. Jacqui described embryos as ‘the step you
need to get through to get pregnant’ and said:
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Eight from the first egg collection which everyone was very positive
about. But the first four didn’t take. . . .Then one other little one died
in the dish. So five didn’t survive, one – anyway there’s one – maybe
there were six. Six didn’t survive, one is now inside going really well
[in her current pregnancy], and one’s in the freezer still.
Unlike the decision to discard as unsuitable, the decision to select
the ‘best’ embryo for use (and store the remainder) was experienced
by many women as a troubling moment of fateful interchangeability.
Jacqui continued:
the scientists will choose the one in the dish that day that appears the
strongest and it might die the next day. Whereas they could’ve chosen
a little weakling which could’ve made the distance. . . . how do the
scientists choose your child? Because they’re – you might run out of
money and the next attempt would’ve been successful but you’ve just
had to draw a line, but the scientist made that choice . . .
To explore this troubling sense of the embryo as both unique
potentiality and yet also an unseen and interchangeable component
part in a mechanised process, I draw attention to Smith’s 1989/1990
untitled sculpture of crystal sperm (Figure 3). The sculpture features
230 crystal sperm, each around six to eight inches long, displayed in
a swirl on a black rubber mat. Each item was hand carved by Smith
(Posner, 2005: 16, 79); thus they are both an en masse representation
of fertile potentiality usually invisible to the naked eye, and a unique
object imprinted with specific features by their progenitor. Although
this work represents gametes rather than embryos I argue that it
speaks to the confounding question of fate and randomness that arose
for women in the study. When women reflected on the choice of
which embryo was used, while others were stored, and perhaps
destroyed, the ultra-modern technological interface of ‘rational’ IVF
jarred against pre-modern notions of ‘nature, destiny and religion’
(Frost et al., 2007: 1018).
Antoinette, who was determined to use all four of her stored
embryos and not to generate extras in future cycles, said:
one got chosen and that became my daughter. Then you think, gee
imagine if they chose a different one and she was still frozen as an
embryo. I don’t know, when I think about those sorts of things, I feel
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like – yeah, like I just feel connected to them and I would like to give
them the chance to be who they might possibly be able to be.
Clarice, who had completed her family and stored three embryos
for more than a decade, said something almost identical about the
difficulty of making a decision to discard her embryos, yet these two
interviewees had diametrically opposed religious and philosophical
views – Antoinette was a Christian for whom embryos were life, and
Clarice was someone with ‘no religion’ who volunteered that she was
pro-abortion. I suggest this juxtaposition is a deft illustration of the
un-universalisable nature of the connection with human embryos,
and of the confounding experience of chance and fate in the process
of IVF conception. Moreover, Clarice felt that she could not discard
without telling her daughter who was ‘from the same batch’ (but not
the other child who was a spontaneous conception) as she imagined
that the child would closely identify with the embryos, even though
she presently knew nothing of them:
Figure 3. Untitled, 1989–90, Schott crystal and rubber.
Source: # Kiki Smith, image courtesy of the Pace Gallery.
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I think that, potentially, at age 13 the idea that there were six embryos
and one got to be her and there’s another three, and we’re just going
chuck them out might be hard for her . . . . It’s about the randomness,
exactly. I don’t have an attachment to those embryos as such but about
honouring something which, in a slightly different context, a random
changing around of things, could easily have been someone like her.
I’m quite comfortable with – if I wanted to discard them, I could do it
quite pragmatically because I’m old enough to know where I stand on
all those really hard shifting questions but she’s not.
Beatrice, who had a child from a donated embryo, and described
herself as a ‘non-practising Anglican’ reflected on this interchange-
ability as follows:
I look at my beautiful little daughter and I think she almost wasn’t
given the opportunity to be born and she is just such a – what’s the
word for it, she just has a real spark of life in her. Perhaps that’s one of
the reasons why she survived being a frozen embryo and so on. It
would be very sad that she wasn’t given an opportunity to be born
because she’s a great little baby.
Danielle, an atheist, in explaining her feeling that she could not
donate for the reproductive use of others, identified acutely with the
experience of the imagined interchangeable future child, slipping
from second to first person:
if you’re a child conceived frommy leftover embryos, one of the ways
you could think about yourself is my real mother got the baby that she
wanted and then got rid of me. You could also think of yourself as
being discarded, unwanted, left over, forgotten . . . . Why didn’t she
implant me? Why didn’t she keep going? Why didn’t she want me?
She got the baby she wanted and then she what, didn’t care?
This theme was also present for Danielle in contemplating
destruction:
If I had to defrost my embryos today, I would not cry about murder.
There wouldn’t be any sense I was killing a baby, that’s not it at all. It
would be a sense of grief for the potential children that they could
have been, my potential children, but not in that framework of Chris-
tian thinking around the light of humanity. That’s not it at all, it’s
about I wonder if that embryo would have looked like my daughter?
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The interchangeability of the embryos with existing children was
not always experienced as anthropomorphising; sometimes the
reverse was the case, in that the embryos were characterised in
overtly instrumentalist terms as a potential source of ‘spare parts’
for existing children (Juliet, Annalise, i.e. as a source of stem cells) or
as ‘reproductive insurance’ in case of the loss of an existing child or
pregnancy (Anne, Clarice, Roger).
Waste and Loss
The final theme I wish to explore here is the difficulty that partici-
pants had in expressing a sense of waste, and loss, concerning dis-
carded embryos (see Farsides and Scott, 2012, concerning clinical
practitioners involved in IVF and PGD [pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis], and Thompson, 2005: 264). Women were very reluctant
to allow embryos to be wasted (de Lacey, 2007: 1755), and this
feeling was especially acute if they were willing to donate for either
reproduction or research use, but had been prevented from doing so
(Millbank et al., 2017). This sense was deeply embodied for the
women who had generated embryos and who characterised them as
a rare and precious resource, regardless of their own religiosity.
Smith’s untitled 1990 sculpture (Figure 4), held in the Whitney
Museum, depicts two life-sized figures, female and male, made of
wax and presented on metal stands at some distance from each other.
Each figure is forlorn, appears battered and bruised, and drips or leaks
fluid associated with fecundity: from him, semen and from her,
breastmilk. This sculpture encapsulates the ‘leaky’ boundaries of
bodies in reproduction (Shildrick, 1997) in a manner that is highly
evocative of loss, and waste. Posner describes the figures as ‘highly
vulnerable’ but not ‘pathetic’, saying, ‘they remain stoic in their
suffering, emotionally if not physically self-contained’ (Posner,
2005: 20). Kiki Smith said of this work that it was about being
‘psychologically thwarted. Her milk nourishes nothing, and his
semen propagates nothing. It is about having all this potential and
yet having no life’ (quoted in Posner, 2005: 20). The figures also
appear to hover, somewhat awkwardly, just off the ground, neither
here nor there; embodied and disembodied.
Women in our study struggled to articulate what the loss of their
embryos meant to them, often framing their feelings by reference to
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(and in contradistinction to) religious doctrine or to other kinds of
reproductive loss (de Lacey, 2007: 1756). For example, Annalise
somewhat hesitantly expressed the view that putting the embryos
to use through donation to fertility research felt less sacrilegious to
her than simply discarding, even though in either option the embryos
would become non-viable:
I just feel that I have a debt of gratitude to IVF – to science. Yes,
because we wouldn’t have our kids without that, so I’d be comfortable
with that. Like I’m Catholic, so I just don’t like to think about the
whole – I’m not anti-abortion or anything – I’m not fanatical about the
fact that that is a life or anything like that. But I would feel more
comfortable using it for that cause than just discarding it.
Likewise, Joanne wanted to donate for research so was actively
contemplating a non-reproductive outcome. However, her clinic
didn’t enable donation to research, so she was grappling with the
complexity of trying to transfer to a clinic which did undertake
Figure 4. Untitled, 1990, beeswax and microcrystalline wax figures on
metal stands.
Source: # Kiki Smith, image courtesy of the Pace Gallery.
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research. For Joanne, her sense of the embryos as valuable entities
and each one as a ‘potential child’ made her more rather than less
determined to pursue this course. (And see similar findings on dona-
tion of fresh embryos, for research in Denmark, including the exact
expression of ‘gratitude to science’: Svendsen, 2007: 32.) Much of
the following quote from Joanne expresses this view through a series
of negatives and double negatives. It is also typical of many inter-
viewees in the use of trailing off and missing words.
Well I probably would like them to get something out of it rather than
nothing. Considering that we’re not going to use them, I don’t – I
don’t know how to put it into words. But I still feel like they’re part of
us. That’s our potential child there. I just don’t want to see it just be
used for nothing. It’s a big decision to – which is why they’re still
sitting there. We haven’t done anything with them. So because they
just can’t – yes. It’s not really they’re rubbish. It’s not – you know.
Many women said they did not want their embryos to be wasted, or
treated as waste (Juliet, Joanne, Sarah, Sam, Annalise, Mariana,
Lucy, Bridget) and expressed distress at the prospect of them being
‘flushed’ or ‘shoved’ down the sink or toilet (Nikki, Ruby, Sam,
Kate), or ‘chucked’ in a bin (Sam, Veronica, Danielle, Scoot, Lois).
For somewomen, the experience ofwastewas re-naturalised through
reproductive metaphors as they analogised the lost potentiality in an
IVF cycle with that of an ordinary menstrual cycle. As Jade said, ‘you
get your period each month so you’re wasting that anyway’. Yet this
analogy was almost instantly disavowed by Ruby even as she made it:
[D]o I just need to be – to save myself – do I just need to be clinical
about it and just go: ‘Don’t be silly, it’s just a – . . . every month, don’t
I, I have a period and I don’t wail and cry and have a ceremo-
ny?’ . . . but these aren’t just eggs at day five, they were blastocysts,
are they blastocysts by day five? Something like that. (Ruby)
Monique emphatically distinguished eggs and embryos on this
basis, and was clear that she wished in future IVF cycles to freeze
only eggs and not embryos. Monique said that an egg is:
just a part of – a piece of something in my body and when you have
your periods you expel an egg, so it’s different and it’s only a part of
me – it’s not a part of both of us.7
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The ineffable nature of this contemplated loss was reflected in the
constant presence of contradiction within quotes. For example Pam, a
scientist who self-described as an atheist, strongly expressed the view
that embryos are ‘just cells’ but then found herself contemplating a
cemetery as the appropriate place to take the embryos upon disposal:
Some sort of participation would be good, sort of mark a chapter so to
speak. I don’t know if I’d want to take them somewhere, mainly
because I’m not sure, like a cemetery, I don’t know, that seems a
bit – well I suppose it’s appropriate . . . . Having said that, they’re not
actually a life form, but anyway.
Asked why she had said a cemetery was ‘appropriate’, Pam
responded, ‘I don’t know, I suppose it’s the difference between the-
ory and feelings. Not that they’re alive but that they won’t become
alive.’ Laurie expressed this as:
[A] dilemma about what you do with that because they’re in a sus-
pended state between life and death . . . . Obviously they’re fertilised
so in that sense they’re viable, but they’re not alive alive.
Likewise when Annalise was asked about whether she would want
to participate in disposal of an embryo (which she had already signed
the paperwork to discard), she responded:
No, not really – yes – I prefer – I don’t want to think about it too much
really.
[Interviewer: Okay, we’ll move on.]
Oh no, I’m happy to talk about it but I wouldn’t – it’d probably be a lot
more real and you can kind of shove it away if you’re not – you know.
Isabel Karpin and David Ellison have referred to the use of ceremony
and ritual associated with embryo disposal as a process of mourning
lost possibility, in particular of the women’s desire for the imagined
child:
But these kinds of transition rituals dedicated to entities that have not
yet lived should not be equated with ceremonies one would offer a lost
child but rather, we suggest, might represent attempts to recognise and
register value in women’s experience of the creation of these
embryos; the physical and emotional effort that has gone into wanting
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and making them. In this way, both life and death for embryos are
by no means objectively, scientifically, legally identifiable
moments. Instead, they might be described as investments – made
typically by women but also by other parental figures – in that which
is desired. Seen this way it is the desire of these figures that should
be considered as enabling the performance of this end scene –
perhaps even just to mourn the loss of that desire. (Karpin and
Ellison, 2011: 95)
Not every IVF participant is conflicted or distressed about the
disposal of their stored embryos (Karpin et al., 2013), nor will
many wish to participate in the disposal process. However, present
clinical practice continues to regard the disposal process as one of
administrative and/or scientific convenience, with little or no space
for participants to express their sense of relatedness, or loss. I
suggest that such feelings can be profound and, if ignored, render
the experience more acute. Embryo disposal decisions and pro-
cesses can, and should, accommodate women’s own sense of what
that end means to them, to include, for example, options such as
return to the body, return to the woman for self-disposal as well as
other means of allowing for a ‘space of its own’. So, for example,
Danielle said:
I don’t think I would want to take them because they’re minuscule,
you can barely see them . . . . If I know what date they’re doing it, I
might arrange for us to have a holiday and be somewhere so that it’s
not just something where I’m vacuuming and suddenly go, oh, it’s 11
o’clock, this is what’s happening. I would want something different,
out of the ordinary, just to give it a space of its own.
Conclusion
Embryos embody women’s hard-won efforts in often prolonged and
painful fertility processes, and their relational ties, both real and
imagined, to and through existing and longed-for children and them-
selves as mothers, mothers-to-be and, sometimes, mothers-never-to-
be (Millbank, 2017). I argue here for increased regard for women’s
own complex and contingent sense of value and connectedness to the
embryos, both as ‘work objects’ (Ehrich et al., 2008; Farsides and
Scott, 2012) and ‘love objects’ (Karpin, 2012: 142).
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A sizable literature in bioethics has been devoted to the question of
what to do with stored embryos (Lyerly et al., 2006, 2010), but
much less has been written on how and why such decisions are
made (Hammarberg and Tinney, 2006; Nachtigall et al., 2009), and
particularly how women feel about these decisions (de Lacey, 2005,
2007; Svendsen, 2007). Provoost and Pennings say that, ‘feelings
have generally been seen as mere side effects of the decisions
related to embryos’ (2014: 189) and they note that ‘there have been
no descriptions of multiple understandings [of human embryos] that
may co-exist in the narratives provided by the actors involved’
(2014: 188). In the context of research conducted in the United
States on decision-making by IVF patients about their stored
embryos, Anne Lyerly and colleagues (2006) suggested a notion
of procreative responsibility that can value a sense of a patient’s
familial connection to embryos outside of the terms of life/personhood
debates; a notion taken further by Elizabeth Roberts, who characterises
stored embryos for some participants as ‘related instead of alive’
(Roberts, 2011: 244). This article aims to contribute to a more nuanced
and contextual approach to women’s decision-making concerning their
stored embryos through attempting to craft a space for the expression of
the complex, and contradictory, emotions attached to these decisions,
unhooked from any notion of abstract moral status inhering in the
embryo itself.
Women in this study grappled with the profound difficulty of
articulating any sense of the embryo as an entity or relation, in the
face of limited language choices, culturally loaded meanings and
closed frames of reference (including a genetically determinist frame
in which both progenitors are ‘equal’ contributors: Lind, 2006; Shel-
don, 2004; Van Der Ploeg, 2004). In the context of pregnancy loss,
feminist thinkers such as Catherine Kevin and others have argued
that abortion politics have silenced or stifled the ability of women to
express their sense of connection and loss to their foetus/intended
baby (Kevin, 2011); while others have noted that medical constructs
of pregnancy loss as based on particular physical stages of pregnancy
have silenced women’s individual experience of connection and grief
(Frost et al., 2007). Foetal-life discourse and anti-abortion politics
cast a long shadow over procreative practices of all kinds (Cohen,
2017; DiCaglio, 2017; Roberts, 2011), even in jurisdictions with
comparatively liberal abortion access such as Australia.
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The tension of ‘life debates’ was apparent in this research, as
women struggled with the language of life and death, and the place
of reproductive metaphors, unable to carve out a space or termi-
nology that could capture their unique experience of connected-
ness. This included experiences of very early ‘chemical’ or
‘technical’ pregnancy loss that they only became aware of by
virtue of being engaged in IVF processes (Cosgrove, 2004) but
also the non-pregnant (Karpin, 2006) or never-to-be-pregnancy,
involving loss of ex-utero embryos that were not, or were never to
be, transferred back to their bodies. Thus many women instantly
disavowed ‘life’ claims or overtly reaffirmed their own pro-abortion
values if they used words such as ‘baby’ or ‘alive’ when trying to
express their sense of relation with their ex-utero or intra-utero
embryos. Sara DiCaglio, in her critique of embryonic development
literature, argues for a more complex and entangled approach to
embryonic existence in order to:
[b]etter understand and value the intimate ecological connections
between bodies, tissues, and worlds; moreover, and more specifical-
ly . . . to better understand how to make theoretical and lived space for
the inevitable losses and complex decisions wrapped up in the process
of reproduction. (DiCaglio, 2017: 18)
This article has reflected on a number of works by American
artist Kiki Smith that address bodily and reproductive themes,
interwoven with women’s own narratives, in order to explore
women’s struggle in expressing feelings of connectedness with
their stored IVF embryos. Utilising the visual arts allows us to
challenge the law’s reliance on static universal categories (Laurie,
2016) – that is, the patient, the viable embryo, the non-viable
embryo, the stored embryo, and so on – and to open spaces of
imagined relations that exist in states of paradox and flux. The
images of Kiki Smith’s artworks selected here are particularly
vivid exemplars of her reproductive oeuvre, providing a framing
device within which such paradoxes of connectivity can be situ-
ated and explored.
Recognition of feelings of connection to the human embryo,
including to imagined future potentiality, need not, and should not,
play into foetal-life discourse or be utilised to delimit women’s
reproductive choices. I argue quite the reverse: proper recognition
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of, and regard for, these complex and contingent feelings of relation-
ality should lead regulators and clinicians to accord women a broader
range of options and practices concerning embryo storage, use and
disposal, including return to the body, self-discard and forms of
ceremony, if these are desired.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to my colleagues Isabel Karpin and Anita Stuhmcke for
their long-standing collaboration on the project and to Isabel,
Katherine Biber, Anthea Vogl and the reviewers and editors
of this journal for their thoughtful comments on this article. Deep
thanks also to all of the interviewees, and to Kiki Smith and the
Pace Gallery. This research was supported by Discovery Project
Grant DP 0986213 and DP 1510157 from the Australian Research
Council.
Notes
1. I draw upon narratives of women who were participants in a previous
empirical study of IVF patients’ decision-making concerning stored
embryos. The study comprised 48 interviews with a total of 54 inter-
viewees. For discussion of methodology and wider findings, see
Millbank et al. (2013). All emphasis within quotes is added by the author
unless otherwise specified.
2. I have deliberately chosen to focus upon the women who undertook, or
were still undertaking, treatment, rather than the male or female partners
who were also interviewed, because of the belief embryos mattered to
the woman undertaking treatment in a way that was both distinctive and
of more intense significance (Millbank, 2017).
3. A major retrospective of her work is freely accessible online via
www.moma.org/kikismith
4. Black Flag is also the name of a late 1970s/early 1980s American punk
band which featured Henry Rollins.
5. I am indebted to Isabel Karpin for this observation.
6. It appears that the clinic required consent from both parties as it would
for any ‘use’ of a viable embryo. Given the fact that there was no viable
material in the straws at the time of release, it is questionable whether
the partner’s permission was required by law.
7. And see de Lacey (2005: 1665) and Provoost et al. (2012) on the embryo
as ‘something of the two of us’.
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